In May 1999 Islamic militants from Pakistan (abetted by the ISI, it is widely believed) infilitrated Kargil and undertook guerrilla actions against the Indian-controlled portion of Jammu & Kashmir. The Kargil Incident was analogous to the Bay of Pigs (…

I would have gladly settled for that as well.

what exactly Mush and co expected to accomplish?

I don’t think it was internationalization; rather it was a play, or more likely tit for tat, for Siachen. The only importance of those heights was for the Leh road.

They did miscalculate badly, like, rather worse than 1965 actually.

the degree to which Nawaz was kept in the dark about key defence and security decisions.

Nothing new in Pakistani politics and military relationship. I recall Benazir Bhutto being completely kept away from the nuclear program when she became Prime Minister.

I wonder what you think of Karamat’s proposal for clearer institutionalisation of decision-making on such security issues.

The national security council could have been a good idea except that in Pakistan the only reason it has been proposed is to institutionalize military intervention in politics. Because of that, I am wary of such proposals.

Well, I would settle for their removal from public life; it is probably too much to expect any such actions towards the Army in the current set up. Besides, it will just inflame passions with the Kashmir and jihadist card being played by the usual suspects. The blunt truth is that no military regime or even one with praetorian tendencies will tolerate such a trial of its senior officers. My puzzlement over Kargil is what exactly Mush and co expected to accomplish; simple internationalisation seems too much of a gamble as would US direct intervention be. In many ways they were also lucky; with the military leadership in India, caught napping thanks to their cosying up to the BJP and their uncritical acceptance of the latter’s peace efforts. It also dealt a serious blow to the supposed stability that the saffron bombniks were claiming would be imparted to Indo-Pak relations in the wake of the nuclear tests.

Nawaz can definitely not escape the blame. Neither can the generals

The interesting thing for me which I didn’t realise was the degree to which Nawaz was kept in the dark about key defence and security decisions. In the account of Reidel, in his meeting with Clinton, he had to learn from the latter that Pakistani army had armed missiles with nuclear warheads and moved them into position for launch against India. This information was given to him during his hurried Washington trip to save some face before a Pakistani withdrawal; it speaks of a serious weakness in the chain of command when the civilian head of the govt has to learn of such an important development from a foreign head of state. To some degree Nawaz has only himself to blame, since he didn’t do much to build confidence in the parliamentary process and interfered with military appointments to no good end. I wonder what you think of Karamat’s proposal for clearer institutionalisation of decision-making on such security issues, before his dismissal. I know Karamat had his own reasons for proposing this and they don’t have much to do with increasing civilian control or democratic accountability of such policy-making but the general line of his proposals comes close to some of what other writers like Amir have been saying.

BBC article was added to memigo. Thanks! (1 other link(s) from this post also found.)
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